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ABSTRACT  
This paper analyses volatility, persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and 
sudden stop (reversibility) of capital flows (foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment, 
long-term and short-term debt flows) using time series econometric techniques for 24 emerging economies over 
1970-2014. This is informative on the pattern and relationship between capital inflows, with implications for 
accommodating macroeconomic policies in countries receiving inflows. The paper also addresses the 
predictions of conventional theory, that differences are associated with the maturity of the capital (long-term vs. 
short-term), with the information based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin (2006), that differences are 
associated with the structure of the capital (equity vs. debt). In line with the latter, equity flows (FDI and 
portfolio) are less volatile and persistent, more predictable and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt flows. 
Contrary to conventional theory, short-term flows are not more volatile, but there is evidence that correlations 
and risks of contagion are strong within all capital flow components. 
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1. Introduction 
“The loans from creditor countries . . . begin with modest amounts, then increase and proceed 
crescendo. They are likely to be made in exceptionally larger amounts toward the culminating 
stage of a period of activity and speculative upswing, and during that stage become larger from 
month to month so long as the upswing continues. With the advent of crises, they are at once cut 
down sharply, even cease entirely.”—Taussig (1927, quoted in Dornbusch, 2002, p. 745).  
International capital mobility is a crucial theme in open economy macroeconomics. It has been treated within 
different theoretical and empirical frameworks under monetary, fiscal, financial, trade, growth and development 
economics with a global outlook. Foreign capital flows to emerging markets, despite being underweighted (a 
lower share than expected) in international portfolios (Tesar, 1999, Sarno and Taylor, 1999a), constitute an 
integral part of that broad topic of economic research.  
According to the observed realizations as shown in Figure 1, external funding to emerging markets have 
followed three recurring phases: crawling initially (the taxi phase) then having surges (the takeoff phase) and 
finally ending up with either soft or hard declines (the landing phase).  
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[Figure 1] 
In conjunction with the controversies on financial liberalization and integration, it is argued that there are 
pros and cons of capital flows to emerging economies. Besides their direct function in financing current account 
imbalances, potential benefits include investment inducement, growth acceleration, consumption smoothing, 
competitiveness gain, macroeconomic discipline reinforcement, financial system efficiency and stability 
enhancement, risk sharing and diversification (see Agénor, 2003, Stulz, 1999, Tesar, 1999). In contrast, rather 
than financing and reconciling current account imbalances, capital inflows are blamed for enlarging the deficits 
even further and making them unsustainable by aggravating economic overheating (WEO, 2007). Among 
others, Obstfeld (1985, 2009) views capital inflows as a ‘problem’ claiming that stabilization programmes based 
on fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes give rise to excess capital inflows which magnify real exchange rate 
appreciations as well as macroeconomic instability and add to deterioration of economic fundamentals through 
inflationary pressures.
1
  
These problems are closely related to the first generation financial crisis models (Krugman, 1979, Flood and 
Garber, 1984). They propose that macro-structural rudiments that are weakened by external and internal over-
expansions, due to risen foreign financing, trigger a deterministic process of speculative attacks against 
international reserves. This process ultimately leads to reserve depletions and currency collapses. Building on an 
explanation of this type, Sachs et al. (1996) show that excessive capital inflows make a financial crisis more 
likely. Other negative side-effects attributed to capital flows are asset price bubbles (Sarno and Taylor, 1999b), 
contagion and spillovers (Obstfeld, 1996, Calvo and Mendoza, 2000), transmission of foreign shocks and 
monetary instability under the compromised policy mix of the central bank (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). Some 
argue that the size and liquidity of international capital markets create the potential for self-fulfilling speculative 
attacks and that financial movements across those markets are subject to animal spirits and investor sentiments 
which characterize surges of panics and manias or euphoria and despair.
2
  
Frankel and Wei (2005) and Kose et al. (2009) conclude that the evidence on advantages and disadvantages 
of international financial liberalization, capital market integration and capital flows is mixed and inconclusive. 
This inconclusiveness arises from a kind of ‘one size fits all’ conduct, which entails the use of total (gross or 
net) capital flows in studying these issues. Hence, total capital flows should be disentangled into appropriate 
components to ensure an accurate, convincing and conclusive analysis. Furthermore, behavioural patterns of 
those components should be illuminated for better understanding and effective management. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 sets out the 
hypotheses to be tested and Section 4 devises the methodology. Data and measurement issues are discussed in 
Section 5, while Section 6 delves into realized volatility of the external financing components. Section 7 deals 
with the process modelling and forecasting, as correlations and comovements are considered in Section 8. 
Volume, volatility and sudden stop linkages are probed in Section 9 and Section 10 assembles final remarks.  
                                                           
1 Not just in case of emerging and developing countries but also for advanced nations capital flows are, at times, regarded as troublesome. 
The following excerpt (from a speech of the former US president, Bill Clinton) in Karolyi (2004) exemplifies this: “...it is now time for the 
world to take the next steps of implementing a new financial architecture and long-term reform of the global financial system. This should 
include steps to reduce the entire financial system’s vulnerability to rapid capital flows...”    
2 See McKinnon and Pill (1998), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005).  
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2. Literature review 
In the literature, there are theoretical and applied treatments that consider compositional and behavioural 
aspects of international financial movements. Modelling financial development and instability in open 
economies, Aghion et al. (2004) suggest that unrestricted and infinitely elastic foreign direct investment (FDI, 
as a substitute for domestic investment), acts countercyclically and stabilizes the economy. Foreign credit, on 
the contrary, is a highly procyclical funding source that—by having knock-on effects on the domestic credit 
expansion—destabilizes the economy. Envisaged as a part of or an addition to the equity of domestic firms, 
restricted and finitely elastic FDI (which may well be interpreted as portfolio equity-like FDI or directly as 
foreign portfolio equity investment that is considered to be complementary to the domestic investment) may also 
cause aggregate instability. Agénor and Aizenman (1998) and Aizenman and Powell (2003) conjecture that 
amplified volatility in cross-border lending (i.e. random shifts in external factors acting as aggregate contagious 
‘shocks’ to productivity) increases financial spreads and the producer cost of capital, resulting in higher 
incidence of default, lower employment and welfare losses. Empirically, transitory and volatile portfolio inflows 
are detected to have negative impacts on future returns (Froot et al., 2001) and new investment spending of 
private firms (Demir, 2009). The volatility of FDI is predicted to decrease economic growth (Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2006).
3
  
On the other hand, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) take a holistic approach while focusing on the 
behavioural side of capital flows. They show that excessive capital flow volatility leads to real and financial 
asset price bubbles which expose the emerging country to bubble-bursts and funding reversals. Financial crises 
are preceded by volatile capital flows resulting from information frictions and default problems in Chari and 
Kehoe (2003). Besides, the notion of ‘capital flow volatility’ is interchangeably used with the term ‘sudden 
stops in capital flows’ by Jeanne and Ranciére (2011), and likewise, with the concept ‘financial crises’—both of 
which are linked to investor herding—by Chari and Kehoe (2004). From this perspective, any comment on 
sudden stops, reversals and financial (banking and currency) crises could be ascribed to capital flow volatility 
and contagion.  
Mendoza (2010) hypothesizes that hampered access to working capital financing, due to sudden stops in 
capital inflows, induces contractions in factor allocations (e.g. heightens unemployment) and production. 
Popularizing the term ‘sudden stop’, Calvo (1998) argues that sudden stops cause insolvency, lower the 
productivity of physical and human capital and engender across-the-board bankruptcies after sharp and 
unexpected changes in relative prices. Forbes and Warnock (2012) demonstrate that the depressed capital flow 
episodes (i.e. sudden stops and retrenchments) are more prone to contagion than the normal episodes of surges 
and flights. Employment and output costs of sudden stops and financial crises are documented in Hutchison and 
Noy (2005, 2006) and Bordo (2008).  
Some applied works have adopted direct approaches to compositional and behavioural dynamics of 
international capital flows. Employing univariate time series data on five industrial and five developing 
                                                           
3 There are also policy prescriptions to contain and control volatility and speculative activity in international financial markets and capital 
flows. In his presidential address at the conference of the Eastern Economic Association in 1978, Washington DC; James Tobin proposed a 
tax (credited to him as ‘Tobin tax’) on capital market transactions to mitigate excess fluctuations and stampedes across the markets and thus 
to serve as ‘sand in the wheels’ of international finance. Tobin (1978) and Eichengreen et al. (1995) formalize the idea, while Uppal (2011) 
reviews its costs and benefits. José Manuel Barroso, then European Commission president, has called for a tax for similar purposes on 
financial transactions throughout the European Union or at least for the Euro Zone (Financial Times, September 28, 2011).      
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countries, Claessens et al. (1995) discover that long-term funding components are at least as volatile and 
unpredictable as short-term components. Hence, the data labels ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ do not signal any 
information about the time series properties of the component in question. Sarno and Taylor (1999a) find 
relatively low permanent components in portfolio and official flows and high permanent components in 
commercial bank lending, while FDI flows are detected to be almost entirely permanent. For nine emerging East 
Asian economies plus Japan and Australia, Sarno and Taylor (1999b) report similar findings. Using group 
medians and means instead of individual time series for the countries from all income levels, Levchenko and 
Mauro (2007) show that there are limited differences across types of flow with respect to volatility, persistence, 
cross-country comovement and correlation with growth. Nevertheless, striking differences are explored around 
the sudden stop episodes: FDI is the most stable, portfolio flows undergo quickly recovering reversals whereas 
bank loans and trade credits tumble severely and stay depressed for some time. Albeit providing useful insights 
about the characteristics of various forms of capital movements, these studies have some shortcomings. There 
are inconsistencies and lack of clarity in sampling (often whether the data are monthly, quarterly or annual is 
unclear), definition (distinguishing the series as net or gross is arbitrary), measurement and scaling of the data 
used. 
My goal in this investigation is to draw on the literature to elucidate the behavioural features of the main 
capital flow components by testing directly the conventional wisdom and the predictions from information-
based trade-off model. Summarized in Claessens et al. (1995), conventional wisdom implies that short-term, as 
labelled on some balance of payments accounts, capital flows (short-term debt and portfolio equity) that are 
influenced by market sentiment are inherently speculative ‘hot’ money sources. Conversely, long-term flows 
(FDI and long-term debt) that are determined by structural factors are considered stable ‘cold’ money sources. 
According to the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin (2006), equity flows are expected to 
see lower reversals (FDI least and portfolio equity less) and hence they are more persistent and predictable. 
Liquid debt flows, however, are predicted to go through higher incidence of sudden stops. In order to analyse 
these maturity (short-term—long-term) and structure (debt—equity) distinctions and thus to provide cogent 
evidence I identify four basic capital flow types: foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio equity investment, 
long-term debt and short-term debt and four structured capital flow types: equity, debt, long term and short term.  
Extending earlier papers and systematically testing the hypotheses that distinguish external funding 
components according to maturity vs. structure, I will also be answering the following questions: (i) Is the 
increase in identified forms of capital flows part of a long-run trend toward greater international diversification 
and risk sharing or is it simply a short-run phenomenon that could reverse suddenly? (ii) Do foreign investors 
take a long horizon in making their investments or are they in pursuit of short-run capital gains? (iii) Are there 
systematic differences across the funding components within the answers to (i) and (ii)?         
3. Theoretical considerations 
Claessens et al. (1995) argue that there is a conventional wisdom shaped by common beliefs about the 
behavioural patterns of different forms of international capital flows. Some accounting labels in the balance of 
payments and some time series tags in other databases (e.g. WDI and GDF of the World Bank) also reflect this 
understanding. The approach is that there is a distinction between foreign financing components as short-term 
and long-term. Short-term capital flows (STERM) which include debt bearing money market securities and 
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loans with a maturity of one year or less and foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI) are regarded as 
inherently volatile and speculative hot money (i.e. funding sources that react to changes in expected risk and 
return, investor psychology and exchange rate differentials) that are also highly reversible and susceptible to 
sudden stops.
4
 On the contrary, long-term capital flows (LTERM) including bonds and loans with a maturity of 
more than one year and foreign direct investment (FDI) are construed as intrinsically stable and predictable cold 
money (i.e. funding sources that respond to slow-moving structural factors and economic fundamentals) which 
are rather irreversible and immune to sudden stops. Therefore, the hypotheses pertinent to the so called 
conventional wisdom can be stipulated as: 
1 ∶= STERM is more volatile than LTERM. 
2 ∶= LTERM is more persistent and predictable than STERM. 
3 ∶= Short term flows are less strongly correlated and co-moving than long term flows.    
4 ∶= LTERM are less prone to sudden stops than STERM. 
In their comprehensive model of information-based trade-off among foreign financing components 
Goldstein and Razin (2006) show that if FDI and FPEI coexist in the equilibrium then, on average, the expected 
liquidity needs of FPEI investors are higher than the expected liquidity needs of FDI investors.
5
 This implies 
that the withdrawal rate of FPEI is higher than that of FDI, resulting in greater volatility of the former relative to 
the latter. It is also proposed that as the investor heterogeneity in terms of the degree of being sensitive to 
liquidity shocks increases, a separating equilibrium—with a large difference between the withdrawal rates and 
volatilities of FDI and FPEI—becomes more likely. They finally suggest that, albeit not explicitly formulated 
but deduced from the model, debt instruments are anticipated to attract investors with even higher liquidity 
needs so such capital movements face the highest withdrawal frequencies and severest fluctuations. This is 
because the return on debt is expected to be less sensitive to liquidity shocks as asymmetric information 
problems do not depress the secondary market price of debt. Thus, a pecking order among the capital flow 
components is established in the sense that there is an equity-debt distinction following the subordinate 
differentiation within equity flows.
6
 Then, the information-based trade-off hypotheses are:              
5 ∶= DEBT is more volatile than EQUITY. 
6 ∶= EQUITY is more persistent and predictable than DEBT. 
7 ∶= Debt flows are less strongly correlated and co-moving than equity flows.    
8 ∶= EQUITY is less prone to sudden stops than DEBT. 
                                                           
4 The view that FPEI is reckoned as a kind of short term capital flow could be traced in Stulz (1999) who states that in a positive feedback 
trading prevalent stock market environment highly liquid short-term financial instruments are open to volatility spawning speculative 
trading. Also see Sachs et al. (1996) as well as ‘hot money’ on Wikipedia.    
5 Information asymmetries in the model are envisaged to take place at two stages. At first stage there is a principal-agent kind of information 
asymmetry that exists between entrepreneurs and managers where the level of ownership reduces the costs and improves efficiency by 
mitigating the effects of information failures. The second stage information asymmetry arises between the current owner and the potential 
buyer when the former happens to sell prior to the maturity. The investor liquidity needs and preferences, instead of market conditions, 
determine the ‘liquidity shocks’ definition of the paper.       
6 Under the assumptions of financial frictions and partial inalienability, Albuquerque (2003) offers an FDI–non-FDI dichotomy for capital 
flow volatility profiles.  
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The hypotheses above will be tested with respect to volatility, persistence and predictability, correlation and 
comovement (or contagion risk) and incidence of sudden stop in turn.   
Under the Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) model of overshooting effects of deterministic liberalization, 
it is also expected that all funding types indicate some degree of permanence as the market reforms and 
liberalizations giving rise to these flows are themselves predominantly permanent events.        
4. Methodology 
It is widely accepted that a consistent measure for the true volatility of a time series is not readily available yet. 
This might partly be due to varying definitions and use of the concept of volatility and partly because of the 
contingent or context-dependent nature of the current measures of volatility.
7
 Hence, I consider feasible 
alternatives to identify consistent regularities in the realized volatility patterns of univariate time series of capital 
flow components and to assess 1 and 5. For the original series I calculate standard deviations and 
coefficients of variation as a preliminary exercise. The latter is used only as a complementary measure to the 
former because I am interested in absolute volatility more than the relative one.
8
  
Following the practice in World Bank (2005) I further decompose the series into trend and cyclical 
components by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, taking the penalty parameter as λ = 6.25 in accordance with 
the frequency power rule of Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Realized fluctuations are measured through standard 
deviations of the cyclical components of these filtered series. The last method is preferred as it is sort of a 
Bayesian approach, similar to the one that Aizenman and Pinto (2005) mention, whereby the relatively more 
predictable and persistent trend component of the underlying variable is abstracted from the unanticipated 
cyclical (stochastic or random) component whose volatility is deemed to capture pure risk or uncertainty and to 
constitute a shock as conceived in Agénor and Aizenman (1998).
9
 This is tantamount to a quasi detrended 
fluctuation analysis (Peng et al., 1994) by which I seek to eliminate the effects of potential nonstationarities and 
long-range dependence in the data—due to high volume, magnitude or scaling—so as to gauge true volatility 
without necessarily modelling it.  
I formally test the difference between realized volatilities (i.e. standard deviations) of the actual and 
detrended capital flow series using Brown-Forsythe variance equality test (Brown and Forsythe, 1974) where 
the sample sizes are taken into account too. This test is chosen among the alternatives since it is found to be 
superior in terms of robustness and power even when the population means are unknown (Conover et al., 1981). 
Line plots are also depicted to show the evolution of volatilities through time.  
I carry forward the behavioural analysis by undertaking process modelling to explore stationarity and 
persistence properties of capital flow series in question and thus to appraise the second and the sixth hypotheses. 
ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) unit root 
tests are performed to determine the order of integration and hence to decide whether a series is stationary. The 
                                                           
7 For instance, Liu et al. (1999) quantify volatility by logarithmic growth rates of the series. 
8 Cox and Sadiraj (2010) argue that the coefficient of variation has poor normative and descriptive performance in risk appraisal and Polly 
(1998) shows that there is size-related bias in the coefficient of variation. See also Sørensen (2002).  
9 Volatility of the cyclical component obtained from the partitioning through HP filter could also be seen analogous to the random 
component in Chari and Kehoe (2003) and stochastic component in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).    
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limitation is that possible outliers or breaks in the series (especially if early or late in the sample period) could 
engender low power in these tests. Following this, an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
model is fitted to the data along with a general-to-specific specification search strategy. Impulse response 
function diagnostics (the period statistics) from these data generating processes (DGPs) are derived to provide 
secondary line of evidence on the degree of permanence of the time series. Furthermore, dynamic out-of-sample 
forecasts are obtained from DGP estimations. Predictability conditions of structured capital flow components 
are, then, assessed with an explicit recourse to mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and Theil inequality 
coefficient (TIC); the favoured statistics as they are scale-independent absolute measures. The lower are these 
indicators the more accurate forecasts are acquired and the higher predictability of the series.      
I compute simple pairwise correlations and percentage proportions of the total variances explained by the 
first principal components to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 7. Following Levchenko and Mauro (2007), I use first 
principal components to measure comovement among funding types within a specific country and risk of 
contagion across countries for a pair or a group of funding type. The principal component method is used for 
factor analysis because, as Rigobon (2002) argues, estimates are consistent even if the data would have 
simultaneous equations or omitted variable biases.
10
     
The last hypotheses of conventional theory and information-based trade-off model (4 and 8, 
respectively) are assessed through identifying and comparing sudden stops or reversibility incidences. A 
reduction of at least 50% from the previous year is defined as a sudden stop in the inflow of a capital flow 
component.    
Finally, as a robustness exercise I carry out random-effects probability unit (probit; à la Bliss, 1934) 
estimations for the potential links between sudden stop, volume and volatility of capital flows. The population 
regression function takes the form of conditional probit representation of an index model of binary response 
Pr = 1| =  										 = 1, … , ; 				 = 1,… ,          (1) 
where,   denotes the dependent variable of sudden stop which is essentially a categorical factor variable taking 
on the dichotomous values of either 0 (failure, no sudden stop) or 1 (success, or sudden stop).  is a 1 × " 
(" ≥ 2 being the number of covariates) row vector of observed explanatory variables containing volumes, 
volatilities and time dummies.  is a " × 1 column vector of parameters to be estimated, and  is the standard 
cumulative normal distribution function.
11
  
5. Data and measurement 
To analyse univariate time series properties of international capital flow composition in 24 emerging countries 
and to test the hypotheses (1 − 8) I identify four basic categories as foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign 
portfolio equity investment (FPEI), long term debt (LTDEBT) and short term debt (STDEBT) and four 
structured categories as equity (EQUITY), debt (DEBT), long term (LTERM) and short term (STERM).     
                                                           
10 Boyson et al. (2010), Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), Bekaert et al. (2009), Bordo and Murshid (2006), Mauro et al. (2002) also employ 
principal component analysis to gauge comovement and contagion.    
11 As stated in Wooldridge (2002), achieving a √-consistent estimator of β is possible by maximizing the partial (sometimes quasi, pseudo 
or only probit) log-likelihood function ∑ ∑ { log + 1 −  log[1 −
-
./
0
./ ]}.  
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FDI refers to net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting 
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvested earnings, and other such long-term and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments of the 
reporting economy. 
FPEI represents non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows which are the sum of country funds, depository 
receipts and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors. EQUITY is the sum of FDI and FPEI.   
LTDEBT is composed of publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt from bonds that are either publicly 
issued or privately placed, publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed long-term commercial bank loans and non-
concessional credits (with an original or extended maturity of more than one year and owed to non-residents and 
repayable in foreign currency, goods or services) from private banks, other private financial institutions, official 
creditors (international organizations like the World Bank, regional development banks, other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies and other sovereign governments), manufacturers, exporters and export credit 
agencies. 
STDEBT consists of publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt arising from underwriting such as notes, 
repos and other money market instruments like treasury bills, commercial papers, bankers’ acceptances and 
certificates of deposit and all the other loans with an original maturity of one year or less.  
To construct FDI, FPEI, LTDEBT and STDEBT series annual liability balances of the relevant balance of 
payments accounts reported by the World Bank and IMF databases are considered.
12
 All four variables of 
fundamental capital flow components (FDI, FPEI, LTDEBT and STDEBT) and structured flows (EQUITY, 
DEBT, LTERM and STERM) are expressed in real (billions of constant 2010 US dollars) terms that are 
believed to be more compatible with the theoretical formulations such as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), 
Kraay et al. (2005), Boyd and Smith (1997). I keep the currency representation of the data that I would lose 
should I use GDP as numéraire.
13
 Besides, conversion of the nominal values into real terms (using the US 
consumer price index as deflator) eliminates potential inflationary and exchange rate valuation effects. 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 provides summary statistics. Having smallest share in international portfolios per country per year 
FPEI is only 2.13 as most emerging countries liberalized their capital accounts and set up domestic exchange 
markets for stock and share trading much later (late 1980s) than the beginning of the overall sampling time 
(1970). Although the long term debt seems to have the highest share, FDI flows are catching up. Short term debt 
is third on average but more than twice as much as FPEI as both have negative minimums indicating net 
outflows. Regarding structured components, LTERM is highest followed by DEBT and EQUITY respectively 
whereas STERM lowest on the mean scale that has a negative minimum of a net outflow.  
Figure 1 encompasses four panels of bar charts and line plots illustrating the average realizations and 
fluctuation patterns of the capital flow components. In terms of capital flow types, the précis given by Table 1 
                                                           
12 I opt to use the net liability balances as they constitute the data of interest. The idea is that, as Dornbusch (2002) argues, when foreign 
financing to a particular sector is withdrawn (i.e. a sudden stop or reversal occurs) that means a capital outflow and not a substitution into 
other assets currently held by that sector.    
13 Binici et al. (2010), Aykut et al. (2010), Neumann et al. (2009), Alfaro et al. (2008), Schularick (2006), UNCTAD (2000) adopt similar 
practice.  
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can broadly be traced throughout this figure as well.
 14
 Over time both volume and volatility of all forms of 
capital flows increase and reach a crescendo in the last decade. During the years of financial crisis as shown by 
vertical grey lines capital flows indicate more oscillatory behaviour.
 15
    
[Figure 2] 
6. Realized volatilities 
Using alternative procedures I measure how basic capital flow components fluctuate over time to evaluate 
the first and fifth hypotheses. The results are sensitive to the choice of measurement, scaling and magnitude of 
the series and the length of time. Regarding the structured capital flow components, however, one can still 
observe important regularities throughout so as to reach conclusions on the volatility hypotheses (i.e. 1 and 
5). Table 2 gives volatility metrics and tests of variance equality. High standard deviations reinforce the 
widely accepted conviction that capital flows to emerging markets are extremely volatile.
16
 The conventional 
approach specified in 1, that short-term capital flows (STERM) fluctuates more than the long-term capital 
flows (LTERM), does not come out unambiguously from the data. However, the information-based trade-off 
model prediction in 5 is confirmed in that equity flows (EQUITY) are observed almost always to be more 
stable than debt flows (DEBT). This finding implicationally supports the premise that debt flows (including 
long-term maturity structured public and publicly guaranteed private external borrowings) pose the main policy 
challenges for and require more effective management by emerging economies.
17
 DEBT being the most volatile 
structural capital flow type also indicates a country level (partially sovereign) debt overhang problem 
precipitated by highly leveraged balance of payments positions which might have added to outbreak of the 
crises (Krugman, 1999, Frankel and Wei, 2005). By and large, erratic oscillations in all forms of financing 
increase over time (Figure 3). Ironically, volatilities themselves are observed to be quite volatile and they 
increase over time especially during crisis years.   
[Table 2] 
[Figure 3] 
7. Process modelling and forecasting 
In addition to volatility, I provide more direct evidence on the persistence and predictability characteristics of 
the capital flow components under consideration (re 2 and 6). To capture the degree of persistence or 
permanence I identify appropriate data generating processes (DGP) by fitting autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) models to the data series and derive the impulse responses from those models. To evaluate 
the degree of predictability for the same series, I get dynamic forecasts using the estimated equation or DGP 
where the time trend is allowed for in each case.  
                                                           
14 As an alternative presentation of the raw data two-way line plots of the time series are illustrated in the appendix. 
15 On the vulnerability generating impact of short-term external borrowing see Kose et al. (2009), Dornbusch (2002), Chang and Velasco 
(2001), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Calvo (1998). 
16 See Martin and Rey (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Aizenman and Pinto (2005), Aghion et al. (2004), Chari and Kehoe 
(2003), Sarno and Taylor (1999a), McKinnon and Pill (1998). 
17 The surmise has been developed and discussed around the concept of ‘debt intolerance’ in Reinhart et al. (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), Eichengreen et al. (2007).    
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Table 3 reports the specified ARIMA models (explicitly indicating the orders of auto-regression, integration 
and moving average only), periods (the number of years during which impulse responses to a one standard 
deviation shock in the estimated model (i.e. corresponding DGP in the table) innovation remain above 0.50 
threshold), and scale independent forecasting measures of mean absolute percentage errors (MAPE; to capture 
forecast accuracy and precision) and Theil inequality coefficients (TIC; to account for the goodness of fit and 
forecast quality).
18
  
[Table 3] 
Inspection of the presented ARIMA models show that all series are the realization of at least difference 
stationary or 31 processes like the case in Sarno and Taylor (1999a). This shows that all capital flow types 
exhibit some degree of permanence as Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) predict.  
Considering the DGPs (the actual models and primarily the order of integration counts of each type) in the 
first place and periods of the capital flow components secondarily, it is seen that LTERM has the longest 
memory and hence is the most persistent whereas EQUITY is the least permanent.  
Thus, considering the persistence part of the second and sixth hypotheses, results support the second hypothesis 
that LTERM is more persistent than STERM whereas EQUITY is less persistent than DEBT unlike the sixth 
hypothesis.   
Regarding the predictability of the capital flow components, the values of MAPE and TIC demonstrate that 
forecast accuracy, quality and goodness of fit properties of EQUITY are the best, lending support to hypothesis 
6. As per hypothesis 2 the outcome is ambiguous as MAPE is highest for STERM (in line with the hypothesis) 
but TIC is lower than LTERM (contrary to the hypothesis). Therefore, it is clear that equity flows are more 
predictable than debt flows but unclear whether long term flows are more predictable than short term flows.              
8. Correlations and comovements 
Pairwise correlation and first principal component variance proportion matrices are given in Table 4. 
Correlations between capital flow components support hypothesis 3 that long-term flows are more strongly 
correlated than short-term flows but does not support hypothesis 7 as debt flows are more strongly correlated 
than equity flows. Regarding the nature of correlations as whether the financing components are substitutes (if 
negatively correlated) or complements (if positively correlated) within emerging markets, they are found to be 
complements. Generally, my findings contradict those of Claessens et al. (1995) and Levchenko and Mauro 
(2007) who show that for countries from all income levels capital flow types are substitutes.  
[Table 4] 
Variance proportions of the first principal components indicate strong comovement and contagion risk 
across countries for a specific (group of) component(s).
19
 Similar to the case in correlations factors common to 
all countries account for more of the total variation in FDI-LTDEBT than in FPEI-STDEBT as in 3 but in 
                                                           
18 Three alternative unit root tests, ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), are 
employed to determine the order of integration of a series. The decision is made for a particular outcome (i.e. the order of integration) if the 
results from at least two tests are statistically equivalent. This is consistent with the account of Stock (1994) that interpretation of the unit 
root tests is a matter of judgement. Results from unit root tests and correlograms with Q-statistics are in the appendix.         
19 Similar observation qualitatively noted for portfolio equity flows in Stulz (1999). 
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contrast to 7 comovement and contagion risk is higher for LTDEBT-STDEBT pair than FDI-FPEI pair. 
Higher risk of contagion in long term and debt-like financial investments implies that determining factors 
behind them might be correlated across emerging countries. Short term and equity-like financing seem to be 
influenced by rather destination-specific factors and policy choices which make them to be less prone to 
contagion. However, no matter their maturity and structure type comovement and contagion risk is high for all 
capital flow components as the proportion explained by first principal component is 51.  
9. Volume, volatility and sudden stop nexus 
Broadly defined as swift decline, reversal or crunch in capital flows; sudden stop is a crucial phenomenon in 
several research efforts for understanding the mechanism of financial crises, evaluating the benefits and harms 
of economic integration and liberalization and assessing pros and cons of capital controls. Sudden stop is also 
intimately linked to the concept of capital flow volatility. Indeed, Jeanne and Rancière (2011) use these terms 
interchangeably. By quantifying the subject matter of sudden stop I test the final hypotheses of conventional 
wisdom and trade-off model (4 and 8, respectively). I also investigate if there is a close association between 
capital flow volatility and sudden stop.  
The sudden stop frequencies are provided in Table 5. In the context of this investigation, a decrease in a 
certain type of foreign financing of at least 50% from the previous year is identified as an incidence of sudden 
stop.
20
 Frequency, then, becomes the number of such measured sudden stops in the capital flow component 
under consideration during the corresponding time period.
21
  
[Table 5] 
In general conformity with the fourth and eighth hypotheses equity and long term flows are less prone to 
sudden stops than debt and short term flows. These results are largely similar to Levchenko and Mauro (2007) 
and Sarno and Taylor (1999a, 1999b): FDI is least reversible while some debt flows (bond and official flows) 
appear quite reversible.  More sudden stop incidence is observed for debt and short term flows over time which 
is another (time varying) indication of the distinction made in 4 and 8.  
As noted, many writers treat capital flow volatility and sudden stop as synonymous, e.g. Jeanne and 
Rancière (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Calvo et al. (2008), Caballero (2003). Via random-effects probit 
regressions I analyse the interrelationship between sudden stop probabilities and capital flow volatilities given 
the volumes of capital flows (i.e. controlling for the real levels in billions of 2010 USD). It is hypothesized that 
the probability of sudden stop in an external funding component is positively (negatively) related to the 
volatility (volume) of that component. 
 [Table 6] 
The results from estimations of the variants of Equation (1) are in Table 6. Under each specification, 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for the corresponding capital flow component designating whether the 
outcome is a sudden stop in that component during the matching year. Volume refers to per capita real forms of 
                                                           
20 Similar and alternative definitions could be found in Bordo et al. (2010), Cavallo and Frankel (2008), Honig (2008), Hutchinson and Noy 
(2006).   
21 Of the similar nature, frequency of sign changes in capital flows are given in Table 6.4 in Lipsey (1999) and the number of sudden stops 
presented in the first tables in Honig (2008), Hutchinson and Noy (2006) and in Figure 1 of Cavallo and Frankel (2008).   
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the series and volatility stands for 3-year rolling standard deviations of the same  series. There are two columns 
per component reporting the estimates derived from two different model specifications. The first controls for 
own volume and volatility nearby unreported constant and time dummies and the second includes volumes and 
volatilities of the other components with unreported constant and time dummies as well to allow for potential 
cross linkages. The results under all these specifications suggest that, for any type of international financing, 
volatility exacerbates the likelihood of a sudden stop whereas volume mitigates it. The inverse relationship 
implies that the more uncertainty muffles the realization and prospect of a flow component the more likely is 
that the inflow of that component will experience an abrupt cessation. Conversely, sudden stop probability 
reducing impact of the volume reveals the fact that as the investors and creditors enlarge their exposure by 
increasing asset purchases and lending they become automatically more committed to a certain market 
destination which makes them more unlikely to retreat from that market all of a sudden. These findings attest to 
the critical role played by stably increased inflow of foreign funding in avoiding or at least alleviating financial 
crashes. Volatility of EQUITY increases sudden stop probability of DEBT while volume decreases it.    
10. Conclusion 
The conventional wisdom and the predictions of the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin 
(2006) are comparatively investigated with reference to behavioural aspects of four major components of capital 
flows. Using annual time series data for the period 1970-2014 for 24 emerging economies, I analyse volatility, 
persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden stop (reversibility) patterns 
of equity flows (foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI)), debt flows 
(long-term debt flows (LTDEBT) and short-term debt flows (STDEBT)), long term flows (FDI and LTDEBT) 
and short term flows (FPEI and STDEBT) through appropriate statistical and econometric techniques. 
I show that, besides a maturity oriented (i.e. long term–short term) polarity, a structural (i.e. equity–debt) 
dichotomy is noticeable in that equity flows (FDI and FPEI) are less volatile and persistent, more predictable 
and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt flows (LTDEBT and STDEBT). Conventional perception that 
short-term financial flows (STDEBT and FPEI) are more volatile than long-term financial flows (LTDEBT and 
FDI) is not supported in my data. Nonetheless, there is evidence that correlations and risks of contagion are 
stronger within the pairs of long-term capital flows (FDI and LTDEBT) and debt flows (LTDEBT and 
STDEBT) than within the short-term capital flows (FPEI and STDEBT) and equity flows (FDI and FPEI) pairs. 
Thus, my findings lend support to majority of the hypotheses from the information-based trade-off model. They 
are also consistent with the majority of the hypotheses from the conventional theory. Finally, I confirm that all 
funding components reveal some permanence, as conjectured by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000).   
Considering results for the individual hypotheses, it is concluded that the conventional claim in the first 
hypothesis—that the long-term capital flows are less volatile than the short-term capital flows—is empirically 
vague. The information-based trade-off model version of this hypothesis (i.e. the fifth hypothesis)—arguing that 
equity flows have lower volatility than debt flows—is plainly verified. Process modelling and forecasting results 
demonstrate that there is partly maturity and structure distinction among the flow components in terms of 
persistence and predictability, backing the second and the sixth hypothesis in part. Furthermore, the correlation 
and comovement hypotheses (that long-term flows are more strongly correlated and comoving than short-term 
13 
 
flows, 3, and that debt (equity) flows are weakly (strongly) correlated and comoving, 7) are also partly 
confirmed. I provide the last, but not least, evidence on the reversibility profiles of global fund flows. The 
finding is that not only short-term funds are more susceptible to sudden stops than long-term funds (Hypothesis 
4) but also is foreign lending more reversible than foreign equity (Hypothesis 8). 
I return to comment on the questions posed in the literature review starting with the last one. It is shown that 
there are indeed systematic differences across funding components. The increase in equity-type of inflows is 
characterized to be part of a long-run trend (given EQUITY is detected to be more stable, less persistent, more 
predictable, less comoving and less reversible) that offer greater diversification and better risk sharing 
opportunities not only for foreign financiers but also for domestic fundraisers. Being less promising on these 
terms and although having longer memory, debt flows seem to be rather short run phenomena that could reverse 
suddenly. These findings are in line with the continuous-time stochastic model of Obstfeld (1994) who proposes 
that an ever-increasing (i.e. strongly trended) international portfolio allocation is associated with the greater 
diversification—pooling portfolios intertemporally with global assets—which in turn leads to substantial risk 
reduction. Sørensen et al. (2007) provide similar evidence. My results also suggest that international investors 
are more likely to chase short-run capital gains and immediate yields on lending, whereas they take long horizon 
and show commitment in making portfolio equity and direct investments.                   
As empirically found, it is possible to see a ‘debt vs. equity’ approach in the recent literature where (from an 
emerging market perspective) equity-like financing is viewed as more favourable than debt financing. Aghion et 
al. (2004) posit that debt flows are largely procyclical and, when excessive, they can magnify the adverse 
impacts of shocks on economic growth. Under the presence of default risk and financial constraints, high 
external leverage may lead to appreciations and fluctuations in the real exchange rate (i.e. the transfer problem) 
which in turn propel fluctuations in the price of the country-specific factor. Considerable liquidation and 
restructuring costs from large-scale bankruptcies that resulted from amplified volatility of firms’ cash flows 
could destabilize the aggregate economy and eventually engender prolonged periods of slumps. They contend, 
on the other hand, that FDI (and equity capital that has informational advantages) characterized as a substitute 
for domestic investment (i.e. perfectly free and infinitely elastic) may well be regarded as a countercyclical 
source that ultimately stabilizes the economy. Moreover, in the absence of restrictions, foreign portfolio and 
direct equity financing provide a less costly alternative (Neumann, 2003) and offer better risk sharing 
opportunities (Stulz, 1999) by reducing the cost of capital (Henry, 2003) and the size of distortionary effects of 
the transfer problem (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).  
Foreign over-borrowing is more likely to give rise to a debt overhang problem both at firm (Myers, 1977) 
and country level (Krugman, 1988), either directly or indirectly through facilitating domestic over-lending. Firm 
level debt overhang that entails risk shifting reduces efficiency and results in underinvestment.
22
 At the country 
level, Aguiar et al. (2009) show that, under the limited commitment and impatience of the government, 
sovereign debt overhang amplifies investment cycles and leads to instability of the aggregate income.
23
 On the 
other hand, over-indebtedness is an integral element of a Fisherian debt-deflation cycle which is held 
                                                           
22 Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Manso (2008), Moyen (2007), Aivazian et al. (2005), Hennessy (2004). 
23 Although investment effect of the country level debt overhang is documented to be ambiguous, the actual service of the debt is found to 
crowd out investment. See Bulow and Rogoff (1990), Warner (1992), in particular, Cohen (1993).  
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responsible for generating financial and economic crises.
24
 Among the three factors that can make financial 
collapse possible, as Krugman (1999) highlights, two (high leverage and large foreign currency debt relative to 
exports) are obviously related to debt funding. Empirically supporting this critique, Frankel and Wei (2005) 
indicate that while the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves increases the probability of a crash, 
combined with inflation within their regression tree analysis, a high ratio of external debt to GDP would also 
place a country in jeopardy.  
From the equity funding side, however, again Frankel and Wei (2005) show that the ratio of FDI and 
portfolio equity to gross foreign liabilities decreases the chance of a crisis. Besides bringing positive 
externalities of financial globalization such as managerial and technological expertise, foreign equity 
investments are estimated to induce investment and boost economic growth (Kose et al., 2009). Finally, Allen 
(2001) argues that the buffer role of equity capital might mitigate the detrimental effects of possible future debt 
overhang and agency problems and attenuate the probability of deadweight costs-creating bankruptcies.  
In the light of these arguments and mindful of some negative features (identified above) of global equity 
flows, as being inclined to contagion and speculation, I suggest that emerging countries—while wisely and 
vigilantly managing debt financing—should prioritize equity financing.
25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
24 See Fisher (1933), McKinnon and Pill (1998), Schneider and Tornell (2004), Mendoza (2010). 
25 For identical recommendations please refer to Eichengreen (2000), Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989).   
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Figure 1. Total capital inflows to emerging markets (1970-2014, Billions of 2010 USD).  
Note: Vertical grey lines correspond to the years (1982, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2007, 2008 and 2009) of currency and financial crises in 
different countries.  
 
 
Table 1. Data summary (1970-2014, Billions of 2010 USD). 
Component Sample Size Mean Median Min Max Total 
Basic 
FDI 45 7.03 2.55 0.34 25.59 316.55 
FPEI 40 2.13 1.03 -0.76 8.14 85.08 
LTDEBT 45 11.81 4.93 1.34 83.32 531.23 
STDEBT 45 4.88 1.76 -1.97 32.03 219.47 
Structured 
EQUITY 45 8.60 3.36 0.13 32.04 386.87 
DEBT 45 16.26 6.13 1.05 110.94 731.55 
LTERM 45 18.40 7.27 1.37 107.57 827.98 
STERM 45 6.45 2.24 -1.60 37.92 290.44 
Note: FDI denotes foreign direct investment, FPEI stands for foreign portfolio equity investment, LTDEBT refers to long term debt and 
STDEBT represents short term debt. Structured flows are that EQUITY is the sum of FDI and FPEI, DEBT is the sum of LTDEBT and 
STDEBT, LTERM (long term) is the sum of FDI and LTDEBT and STERM (short term) is the sum of FPEI and STDEBT. The number of 
observations for the available annual data is given under the third column (Sample Size). Data come from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH), International Debt Statistics (IDS) databases of the World Bank and International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF. 
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Figure 2. Capital inflows to emerging markets by component (1970-2014, Billions of 2010 USD). 
Note: See notes to Figure 1 and Table 1.  
 
 
Table 2. Volatility measures and tests for structured capital flow components. 
Component 
Standard 
deviation 
Coef. of 
variation 
 Brown-Forsythe variance equality tests 
 EQUITY  DEBT  LTERM 
 Stat p-value  Stat p-value  Stat p-value 
Unfiltered 
EQUITY 10.54 1.23          
DEBT 26.45 1.63  1.64 0.20       
LTERM 25.79 1.40  3.58 0.06  0.16 0.69    
STERM 10.41 1.61  0.90 0.35  2.98 0.09  5.55 0.02 
Filtered 
EQUITY 1.61 -2.85e+16          
DEBT 3.93 -7.59e+16  3.50 0.06       
LTERM 3.89 4.51e+17  4.62 0.03  0.03 0.86    
STERM 2.31 1.34e+17  2.43 0.12  0.71 0.40  1.16 0.28 
Note: Brown-Forsythe variance equality test evaluates the null hypothesis that the variances of paired capital flow components are equal 
against the alternative of different variances. See also notes to Table 1. 
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Figure 3. Volatility of structured capital flow components over time.  
Note: Numbers on the horizontal axis are 3-year sub-periods. See notes to Figure 2 as well.  
 
 
Table 3. Data generating processes (DGP) and forecasting for structured capital flow components. 
Series 
DGPs and model diagnostics  Forecast evaluation 
DGP Period q-stat p-value  MAPE  TIC 
EQUITY ARIMA(1,1,1) 2 2.94 0.09  62.33  0.11 
DEBT ARIMA(2,2,1) 6 0.98 0.32  842.83  0.83 
LTERM ARIMA(2,2,1) 8 1.84 0.18  429.33  0.77 
STERM ARIMA(1,1,1) 3 1.14 0.29   2927.72   0.24 
Note: Each autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model is estimated via nonlinear least squares (NLS) by applying a 
Marquardt NLS algorithm to the transformed equation. Note that the NLS estimates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimates and are asymptotically efficient. Numbers in parentheses respectively show the order of auto-regression (AR), integration 
(I), and moving average (MA). Period indicates the number of years during which impulse responses to a one-time shock in the innovation 
(a one standard deviation shock using the standard error of the regression for the estimated equation and taking account of innovation 
uncertainty) stand above 0.50 in absolute values. Although it is a common measure for residual persistence in the series, the ‘period’ statistic 
has a different meaning for stationary and unit root processes. For stationary processes, it shows the number of periods that the level remains 
above 0.50; whereas for unit root processes, it shows the number of periods that the growth rate remains above 0.50 following a unit shock. 
Under q-stat given are p-values from the Q statistic of serial correlation test for the model errors. A p-value greater than 0.10 validates the 
specification fitted in the sense that there is no serial correlation left uncontrolled in the residuals. Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 
and Theil inequality coefficient (TIC) are scale invariant indicators employed to evaluate dynamic forecasting performance of each 
component. 
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Table 4. Pairwise correlations and principal components, 1970-2014. 
Series 
Pairwise correlations  First principal component proportions 
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT  FDI FPEI LTDEBT ALL 
FDI 1.00     1.00    
          
FPEI 0.32 1.00    0.66 1.00   
 (0.00)        0.51 
LTDEBT 0.15 -0.04 1.00   0.57 0.52 1.00  
 (0.00) (0.29)        
STDEBT 0.33 0.05 0.91 1.00   0.67 0.52  0.96  
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.00)         
Note: ALL refers to the group of the four components altogether. p-values in parentheses. First principal components are the percentage 
proportions of total variance explained by the first principal components (i.e. factors common to all variables in a set of time series) which 
are the unit-length linear combinations of the original variables with maximum variance. 
 
 
Table 5. Frequency of sudden stops.  
Series 
Observations   Sudden stop frequencies 
1970-2014  1970-2014 1970-1984 1985-1999  2000-2014 
EQUITY 1080  143 69 36  38 
DEBT 1080  343 73 131  139 
LTERM 1080  195 68 66  61 
STERM 1080  476 114  180   182 
Note: Sudden stop is defined as abrupt cessation, drop or reversal of capital flows. Quantitatively, a decrease in a certain type of foreign 
financing of at least 50% from the previous year is identified as an incidence of sudden stop. Frequency is the number of sudden stops 
(country, year) in the capital flow component under consideration during the corresponding time period. 
 
 
Table 6. Random-effects probit estimations of sudden Stops (Annual panel data, 1970-2014). 
 EQUITY (1) EQUITY (2) DEBT (1) DEBT (2) LTERM (1) LTERM (2) STERM (1) STERM (2) 
EQUITY  
Volume 
-0.0840*** 
(0.015) 
-0.0856*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
-0.0091* 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.0048 
(0.011) 
 
 
0.0142*** 
(0.004) 
EQUITY  
Volatility 
0.0035 
(0.004) 
0.0143 
(0.051) 
 
 
0.0995*** 
(0.037) 
 
 
0.0483 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.0246 
(0.037) 
DEBT  
Volume 
 
 
0.0142 
(0.010) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0279*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.0678*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
0.0043 
(0.003) 
DEBT  
Volatility 
 
 
0.0507 
(0.055) 
0.0034*** 
(0.001) 
0.0547 
(0.042) 
 
 
0.0590 
(0.051) 
 
 
-0.0112 
(0.041) 
LTERM  
Volume 
 
 
-0.0148 
(0.013) 
 
 
0.0139** 
(0.006) 
-0.0774*** 
(0.011) 
-0.0478*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
0.0000 
(.) 
LTERM  
Volatility 
 
 
-0.0538 
(0.066) 
 
 
-0.0735 
(0.050) 
0.0031** 
(0.001) 
-0.0742 
(0.060) 
 
 
-0.0330 
(0.049) 
STERM  
Volume 
 
 
0.0000 
(.) 
 
 
0.0000 
(.) 
 
 
0.0000 
(.) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0614*** 
(0.009) 
STERM  
Volatility 
 
 
-0.0435 
(0.071) 
 
 
-0.0796 
(0.056) 
 
 
-0.0485 
(0.066) 
0.0133*** 
(0.002) 
0.0976* 
(0.055) 
Observations 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Note: Under each specification, dependent variable is a binary indicator for the corresponding capital flow component designating whether 
the outcome is a sudden stop in that component during the matching year. Volume refers to original (unfiltered) per capita real capital flow 
series and volatility refers to 3-year rolling standard deviations of the structured series. Unreported constant and time dummies (period fixed 
effects) are included in all regressions. (.) means omission due to collinearity. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and 
*** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See notes to Table 5 as well. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Sample emerging countries. 
Argentina China Hungary Mexico Philippines South Africa 
Brazil Colombia India Morocco Poland Thailand 
Bulgaria Ecuador Indonesia Pakistan Romania Tunisia 
Chile Egypt Malaysia Peru Russia Turkey 
 
 
 
Table A2. Unit root tests for structured capital flow components. 
Test Type 
EQUITY  DEBT  LTERM  STERM 
Stat p-value  Stat p-value  Stat p-value  Stat p-value 
Level 
ADFµ,τ -1.61 0.77  4.49 1.00  -0.33 0.99  -1.09 0.92 
PPµ,τ -1.61 0.77  2.97 1.00  2.87 1.00  -0.84 0.95 
KPSSµ,τ 0.20 0.22  0.18 0.22  0.19 0.22  0.19 0.22 
1
st
 Difference 
ADFµ,τ -5.95 0.00  1.47 1.00  -1.37 0.85  -6.61 0.00 
PPµ,τ -5.96 0.00  -5.62 0.00  -5.72 0.00  -7.49 0.00 
KPSSµ,τ 0.04 0.22
 
 0.18 0.22  0.14 0.22  0.21 0.22 
2
nd
 Difference 
ADFµ,τ  
 
 -9.33 0.00  -8.99 0.00    
PPµ,τ  
 
 -22.88 0.00  -20.94 0.00    
KPSSµ,τ  
 
 0.18 0.22  0.50 0.22    
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979), Phillips-Perron (PP, 1988), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992) are the 
alternative tools for testing a series (or the first or second difference of the series) for the presence of a unit root. Subscripts τ and µ indicate 
whether a time trend and a constant term are included in the test specification.  
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Figure A1. Time series plots of basic and structured capital flow components (1970-2014, billions of 2010 
USD). 
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Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*
1 -0.130 -0.130 0.7932
2 -0.189 -0.209 2.5099
3 0.094 0.039 2.9437 0.086
4 -0.208 -0.242 5.1337 0.077
5 -0.065 -0.114 5.3519 0.148
6 0.132 0.009 6.2847 0.179
7 -0.164 -0.183 7.7605 0.170
8 0.015 -0.057 7.7727 0.255
9 -0.095 -0.260 8.2952 0.307
10 0.053 0.014 8.4625 0.390
11 0.040 -0.123 8.5589 0.479
12 -0.072 -0.144 8.8911 0.542
13 0.108 -0.004 9.6483 0.562
14 0.087 0.004 10.163 0.602
15 -0.088 -0.032 10.704 0.636
16 0.008 -0.120 10.709 0.709
17 0.003 -0.015 10.709 0.773
18 -0.012 -0.012 10.721 0.826
19 0.016 -0.029 10.742 0.870
20 -0.023 -0.059 10.788 0.903
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*
1 -0.105 -0.105 0.5077
2 0.017 0.006 0.5214
3 -0.097 -0.096 0.9755 0.323
4 0.167 0.150 2.3586 0.307
5 -0.030 0.001 2.4058 0.493
6 0.065 0.055 2.6302 0.621
7 -0.019 0.021 2.6490 0.754
8 0.064 0.039 2.8737 0.825
9 -0.086 -0.066 3.2960 0.856
10 -0.004 -0.037 3.2970 0.914
11 -0.063 -0.063 3.5386 0.939
12 -0.079 -0.128 3.9260 0.951
13 -0.118 -0.128 4.8190 0.940
14 -0.044 -0.088 4.9456 0.960
15 -0.006 -0.017 4.9485 0.976
16 0.021 0.033 4.9793 0.986
17 -0.080 -0.034 5.4511 0.988
18 -0.008 0.013 5.4567 0.993
19 -0.011 0.016 5.4672 0.996
20 -0.002 -0.006 5.4676 0.998
30 
 
LTERM 
 
STERM 
 
Figure A2. Q-Statistics and correlograms for DGPs of structured capital flow components. 
 
 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*
1 0.024 0.024 0.0262
2 -0.128 -0.129 0.8023
3 0.147 0.156 1.8409 0.175
4 -0.143 -0.178 2.8594 0.239
5 -0.112 -0.057 3.5017 0.321
6 0.057 -0.001 3.6719 0.452
7 0.071 0.099 3.9434 0.558
8 0.012 0.012 3.9519 0.683
9 0.022 0.008 3.9794 0.782
10 -0.013 -0.036 3.9893 0.858
11 -0.095 -0.069 4.5387 0.873
12 -0.102 -0.093 5.1906 0.878
13 -0.112 -0.126 5.9936 0.874
14 -0.041 -0.049 6.1081 0.911
15 0.016 -0.017 6.1265 0.941
16 -0.010 -0.033 6.1338 0.963
17 -0.009 -0.043 6.1395 0.977
18 -0.003 -0.025 6.1404 0.987
19 -0.022 -0.006 6.1795 0.992
20 0.014 0.038 6.1956 0.995
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*
1 0.047 0.047 0.1022
2 -0.025 -0.027 0.1322
3 -0.143 -0.141 1.1448 0.285
4 0.061 0.075 1.3353 0.513
5 -0.096 -0.112 1.8089 0.613
6 0.219 0.222 4.3614 0.359
7 -0.034 -0.057 4.4229 0.490
8 -0.025 -0.038 4.4583 0.615
9 -0.064 0.011 4.6976 0.697
10 0.135 0.089 5.7773 0.672
11 -0.046 -0.024 5.9096 0.749
12 -0.077 -0.134 6.2840 0.791
13 -0.123 -0.072 7.2659 0.777
14 -0.062 -0.079 7.5227 0.821
15 -0.084 -0.071 8.0116 0.843
16 0.005 -0.068 8.0136 0.889
17 -0.002 -0.012 8.0139 0.923
18 -0.045 -0.034 8.1732 0.944
19 -0.004 0.033 8.1746 0.963
20 -0.002 -0.020 8.1749 0.976
